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31. Introduction
• Anticipated advent of U.S. Government sponsoring human-tended 
research and human medical studies on commercial suborbital flights 
necessitates establishment of safety review procedures for federal 
agencies to allow government-sponsored SFPs aboard these vehicles.
• Three Payload Categories:
‒ Stand-alone
‒ Tended by crew member employed by flight provider
‒ Interactive / interpreted payloads requiring tending by investigator
• U.S. Congress encouraging emergence of commercial space capabilities 
by limiting government regulatory requirements:
‒ Commercial sRLV providers are licensed under FAA-AST regulations to assure 
safety of the uninvolved public under a designated “learning period.”
‒ FAA-AST has developed and published recommended practices for human 
spaceflight occupant safety and training, discussed later, to serve as guidelines 
for developers during this learning period.  These recommended practices are 
intended to be translated into a regulatory safety certification regime after the 
learning period expires.
‒ SFPs are informed that the vehicle has not been independently certified as safe 
by the FAA.  They are informed of specific risks and must sign a waiver of liability 
based on informed consent.
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42A. FAA and NASA Flight Participant Safety 
Practices
• Aviation
– FAA has established and modified rules over decades to ensure passenger safety
• Proven maintenance standards and practices based on practical experiences
• Rigorous aircrew training standards and requirements
– NASA’s aviation safety authority pre-dates FAA and self-regulates NASA-
sponsored personnel aboard public-use and non-NASA-controlled aircraft
• Astronauts
– (NPR) 8705.2C*: Establishes procedural and technical requirements for human-
rating certification.  Exceptions are the ISS and Soyuz (and in an earlier revision, 
the Space Shuttle), which are not required to obtain a human-rating certification.  
Those programs “utilize existing policies, procedures, and requirements to certify 
their systems for NASA missions.”
• “Government Astronauts”
– Space Act of 2015** created new category of NASA people flying on commercial 
rockets, viz., “Government Astronauts”
– Allows highly trained astronauts to perform operations not allowed for SFPs
– NASA Administrator identifies which flight occupants are so designated
*Human-Rating Requirements for Space Flight Systems, NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8705.2C: 
https://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/N_PR_8705_002C_/N_PR_8705_002C_.pdf
**H.R.2262 - U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act
52B. FAA and NASA Flight Participant Safety 
Practices – Soyuz
Multiple solutions along “arc of acceptability” have proven successful:
Reference: “NASA Astronauts on Soyuz: Experience and Lessons for the Future,” prepared by Office of Safety and 
Mission Assurance (OSMA) Assessments Team, Johnson Space Center, Houston, NASA/SP-2010-578, Aug 2010.
https://spaceflight.nasa.gov/outreach/SignificantIncidents/assets/nasa-astronauts-on-soyuz.pdf
63A. Parametrically Projected Safety of 
Suborbital RLVs
• Goal:  Develop a model for predicting safety of new rocket-powered sRLVs
• Approach:  Evaluate effects of vehicle catastrophic failure on the vehicle provider’s business case, focusing 
on demand vs. supply.  This market focus emphasized “probability of failure” as opposed to more 
conventional reliability modeling approaches based on “probability of success.”
• Primary Challenge:  To bridge performance data and cultural differences across several distinct areas with 
scant data:
1. Subsonic, supersonic, and orbital flight
2. Expendable and reusable vehicles, human-rated and non-human-rated
3. Old and new technologies
4. Past vs. present concepts of safety (user and government culture)
5. Vehicle end use (commercial, recreational, government, military)
6. Differences in vehicle test programs (minimal versus extensive)
• Parametric Approach:  The predictions were based upon 2015 flight technology, Mach 3.5 maximum speed, 
professionally piloted human-rated systems, FAA controlled airspace/flight rules, FAA safety regulations, 
and flight profile and other variables, all programmed into the model. 
• Result:  Safety comparison of a specific sRLV against other flight vehicle categories and activities. Safety of 
examined RLV was found to range across columns C and D on next slide.
• Conclusions:  The developed model can be a useful tool for comparing candidates to historical systems and 
constructing a Business Case Analysis for newly developed flight vehicles. The model responds to changes 
in parameters deemed important to flight safety and is calibrated to relevant history.
Reference: Webb, D. W., G. S. Williams, A. Q. Tu, R. W. Seibold, C. E. Baker, and R. M. Young, “Market Demand 
Methodology for U.S. Suborbital Reusable Launch Vehicle Industry,” AIAA Space 2014 Conference and 
Exposition, San Diego, CA, AIAA paper 2014-4201, August 4-7, 2014.
73B. Probability of Catastrophic Failure for Flight 
Vehicles and from Other Activities 
Safety of examined RLV was found to
range across columns C and D.
1. Webb, D. W., G. S. Williams, A. Q. Tu, R. W. Seibold, C. E. Baker, and R. M. Young, “Market Demand Methodology 
for U.S. Suborbital Reusable Launch Vehicle Industry,” AIAA Space 2014 Conference and Exposition, San Diego, 
CA, AIAA paper 2014-4201, August 4-7, 2014.
2. Global Fatal Accident Review, 2002 to 2011, CAP 1036, U.K. Civil Aviation Authority, June 2013.
https://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP%201036%20Global%20Fatal%20Accident%20Review%202002%20to%2
02011.pdf
84. FAA-AST Sponsored Study: Vehicle Guidelines 
for Safety-Critical Areas of sRLVs
The Aerospace Corporation was tasked by FAA-AST in 2002-2003 to develop minimum vehicle 
guidelines for safety-critical areas of commercial RLVs, necessary to ensure the safety of flight crew 
and passengers. This study informed development of FAA recommended practices for human 
spaceflight safety (discussed later in Section 8).
• The guidelines were developed by reviewing and analyzing specifications, requirements, and 
lessons-learned for safety of commercial, military, and experimental aircraft, military space systems, 
and past and present human-carrying space systems, followed by interpolation and projection of 
these requirements for crew and passengers aboard both suborbital and orbital categories of future 
commercial RLVs. 
• Subsystems evaluated:
‒ environmental control and life support system
‒ main propulsion system
‒ guidance, navigation, and control system
‒ avionics and software
‒ main structural system
‒ thermal protection system
‒ thermal control system
‒ health monitoring system
‒ electrical power system
‒ mechanical systems
‒ flight safety system
‒ crew system
Reference: Patel, N. R., J.C. Martin, R. J. Francis, and R. W. Seibold, “Human Flight Safety Guidelines for Reusable 
Launch Vehicles,” Final Report, U.S. Department of Transportation Contract DTRS57-99-D-00062, Tasks 2 and 3, 
Aerospace Corporation Report ATR-2003(5050)-1, July 31, 2003.
95. FAA-AST Sponsored Study: Space Weather 
Biological and System Effects for Suborbital Flights 
Objectives:
• Identify and describe typical dose rates and expected radiation hazards to crew and SFPs on 
suborbital flights from low, middle, and high latitudes, including effects of solar cycle and extreme 
solar and geomagnetic events.
• Based on the hazards identified, determine mitigation measures and safe phenomena threshold 
levels. Determine recommended flight rules to minimize space weather hazards based on results of 
the mitigation methods.  
Conclusions:
• Owing to the short duration of flights (~30 min. or less) and the even shorter exposure at altitudes 
where atmospheric shielding is significantly reduced (~ 5 min.), exposure of crew and passengers is 
minimal, except under circumstances where solar particle events (SPEs) occur, which is less than 
about 5% of the time.  Under typical conditions, the radiation exposure to crew and passengers on a 
suborbital flight is less than that for a long duration airline flight.
• Avoiding exposure to potentially harmful radiation associated with solar or geophysical disturbances 
can be achieved by locating launch sites at middle latitudes, or lower, or by delaying flights when 
there are indications that an SPE is in progress or is imminent.  For a high-latitude site, a possible 
launch commit criterion could be based on event probability distributions. 
Reference: Turner, R. E., T. A. Farrier, J. E. Mazur, R. L. Walterscheid, and R.W. Seibold, “Space Weather Biological 
and System Effects for Suborbital Flights,” Final Report, U. S. Department of Transportation Contract DTRT57-05-D-
30103, Task 13B, Aerospace Corporation Report No. ATR-2009(5390)-1, October 31, 2008.
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/reports_studies/media/ATR-2009(5390)-1.pdf
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6. SFP Informed Consent
Legislation:
• Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act (CSLAA), 2004
• U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, 2015
Legislation gives FAA-AST authority to regulate commercial space flight 
but does not allow the FAA to regulate the safety of people aboard 
space vehicles.  Instead, the law requires informed consent of onboard 
crew and passengers.  The occupants must state in writing that they (1) 
understand that the U.S. Government has not certified the space launch 
or reentry vehicle as safe and (2) be informed of the risks of the vehicle 
they are boarding and others like it.
Reference: Nield, G. C., N. Johnson, J. Duffy, and J. Sloan, “Informed Consent in Commercial Space Transportation 
Safety,” IAC-13-D5.1.4, Sept 2013.
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/programs/international_affairs/media/Informed_Consent_
paper_IAC_Sept_2013_FAAfinal.pdf
Waiver of liability and informed consent are two different things.
U.S. Government civil servants cannot grant liability waivers.
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7A. FAA-AST Compilation: U.S. Human 
Space Flight Safety Record




7B. Footnotes from Previous Chart
1. Peop le on orbital space flights i 1clude Mercury (Atllas) (4), Gemini (20), Apollo (36), Skylab (9) and Space 
Shuttle (8.52) 
a) Occupants are cou nted even if they fl ew on on ly the launch or reentry portion. The Sp,ace Shuttle launched 817 hum.ans and 
picked up 35 humans from MIR and the International Space Station 
2. Peop le on suborbital space flights incllude include X-15 (169), M2 (24),, Mercury (Redstone), (2), 
SpaceShipOne (.5) and SpaceShipTwo (8) 
a. Only occupants on the rocket -powered sp,ace bound vehicles are counted per safety reco rd criterion #11 
3. Deaths and serious · 1juries include X-1.5 (1), Apollo-Soyl z Test P'roject (3), Challenger (7),, Columbia (7), and 
SpaceShipTwo (2) 
a) Deaths or se rious injuries that occurred when there was no in tent to launch (e.g. Apollo 1 fire), are not counted per safety reco rd 
criterion #9 
b) Alan Bean during splashdown on Apollo 12 suffered a conouss ion. The FAA uses the NTSB's defin it ion of serious injury (criterion 
#13), but t ne NTSB does not consider a concussion itself a serious injury. The IFM will re main consistent wft n the NTSB and not 
count this incident as a serious in"ury 
4. Orbital flights include Me cury (Atlas) (4),, Gemini (10), Apollo (12), Skylab (3), and Space Shuttle (135} 
5. Suborbital flights indude X-1.5 (169), M2 (24),, Mercury (Redstone), (2), SpaceShipO 1e (5), and SpaceShipTwo 
(4) 
a) Glide flrgh ts are not co unted pe r safety record cri'te rion #2 
b) Flights t hat fail to meet the definition of suborbita l rooket in 14 CFR § 401 . 5 are not coun ted (t hrust must be greater than lift ) e.g. 
some X-15 and M2 fl ights 




8A. Recommended Practices for Human 
Space Flight Occupant Safety – FAA-AST
After working closely with NASA, industry, and other key stakeholders, FAA-
AST issued its “Recommended Practices for Human Space Flight Occupant 
Safety.” This document was the culmination of a 3-year effort, which involved 
researching existing human spaceflight standards, conducting a series of 
public teleconferences to gather recommendations, and soliciting feedback 
from the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC).
“Recommended Practices for Human Space Flight Occupant Safety,” Version 
1.0, FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation, August 27, 2014.
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/Recommended_Practic
es_for_HSF_Occupant_Safety-Version_1-TC14-0037.pdf
All U.S. commercial sRLV flights are licensed and regulated by FAA-AST.  However, 
FAA-AST does not certify the vehicles or regulate safety of crew or SFPs.
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8B. Recommended Practices for Human 
Space Flight Occupant Safety – FAA-AST
Approach:
• FAA reviewed existing government and private sector requirements and 
standards
• Chose to primarily use NASA’s requirements and guidance for Commercial 
Crew Program (1100 Series) as a guide.
– Purpose was not to copy NASA’s requirements, but to use them as a means to 
capture relevant safety concepts.
• Consulted with:
– Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) 
– FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI)
– FAA Center of Excellence for Commercial Space Transportation 
– NASA: Meeting held November 12, 2013.  
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8C. Recommended Practices for Human 
Space Flight Occupant Safety – FAA-AST
Scope: 
• Occupant safety only
– Public safety and mission assurance not directly addressed
– Orbital and suborbital flights
• Orbital rendezvous and docking, long duration flights, extravehicular activity, and 
flights beyond earth orbit not explicitly covered
• Period of coverage – from when occupants are exposed to vehicle hazards prior to 
flight through when they are no longer exposed to vehicle hazards after landing
Safety Level:
• No specific level of safety (risk) due to wide variety of systems and flight profiles likely 
in the near future
• Two levels of care articulated:
– Occupants should not experience an environment during flight that would cause 
death or serious injury (a low bar)
– Level of care for flight crew when performing safety critical operations is 
increased to level necessary to perform those operations  
In an emergency the same level of care is not expected to be maintained – only a 
reasonable chance of survival
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8D. Recommended Practices for Human 
Space Flight Occupant Safety – FAA-AST
Assumptions:
• Covers suborbital and orbital launch and reentry vehicles
– Orbital vehicles
• Stay on orbit for 2 weeks maximum
• Can return to earth in under 24 hours if necessary
• Each flight crew member is safety-critical 
• SFPs may be called upon to perform limited safety-critical tasks
• Clean sheet philosophy – no other regulations act to protect occupants from harm
Notable Omissions:
• Medical limits for SFPs
– Medical consultation recommended
– SFPs free to assess their individual risk
• Ionizing radiation
– Long-term health issues not addressed
• Integration of occupant and public safety
– Area for future FAA-AST work
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8E. Recommended Practices for Human 
Space Flight Occupant Safety – FAA-AST
Recommended Practices Covered:
• Design 
– Human Needs and Accommodations 
– Human Protection 
– Flightworthiness 
– Human/Vehicle Integration 
– System Safety 




– System Safety 
– Planning, Procedures, and Rules 
– Medical Considerations 
– Training 
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9. IAASS Space Safety Guidelines
• In March 2010, the IAASS issued Space Safety Standard IAASS-ISSB-S-
1700-Rev-B, “Commercial Human-Rated System.  The requirements in this 
document were established on the basis of the safety experience 
accumulated in human spaceflight to date.
• In December 2013, the IAASS issued guidelines for the safe regulation, 
design, and operation of suborbital vehicles.* 
• Recently SAE International and IAASS co-published a standard, IAASS-
SSI-1700, “Commercial Human-Rated System,” as a step towards the 
establishment of a complete set of safety, technical, and management 
standards to be used by industry for the design and development of 
commercial space systems, and by an independent third-party, the Space 
Safety Institute, for their certification.
*Guidelines for the Safe Regulation, Design and Operation of Suborbital Vehicles, Manual, International 




10A. Medical Assessment of Humans for Flight
Bendrick, G. A.,* Chief Medical Officer, NASA-Armstrong Flight Research 
Center, “Assessing the Human for Flight,” NASA Engineering and Safety 
Center (NESC) Academy, June 13, 2017:
• Medical assessment of pilots and astronauts to ensure they are medically 
qualified for flight duties
• Medical examiner acts on behalf of the regulatory agency to help ensure 
safety of flight:
– The performance of specific examination REQUIREMENTS, 
– Identifying whether or not the individual meets specified STANDARDS, and if not;
– Determining the appropriate WAIVER questions or concerns that must be 
satisfactorily addressed before a safe return to flight can be implemented.
• The 1% rule
– Denies medical certificate to airline pilot if their risk of a medical incapacitation 
(e.g., heart attack, convulsion, stroke, fainting, etc.) is determined to be greater 
than 1% per annum
• Medical surveillance 
*Present address: FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI), Oklahoma City
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10B. Medical Screening of Commercial 
Aerospace Passengers 
• CAMI report* provides general guidance for operators of manned commercial 
aerospace flights (suborbital and orbital) in the medical assessment of 
prospective passengers:
– Categories of Passengers:
• Passengers participating in suborbital aerospace flights (or exposed to G-
load of up to +3Gz during any phase of the flight)
• Passengers participating in orbital aerospace flights (or exposed to G-
load exceeding +3Gz during any phase of the flight)
– Discusses acceleration risks associated with the neurological, 
cardiovascular, and musculoskeletal systems
– Discusses medical conditions that may contra-indicate passenger 
participation in suborbital or orbital flights and disposition of prospective 
passengers with these conditions
• These medical considerations were considered in FAA-AST’s “Recommended 
Practices for Human Space Flight Occupant Safety”
*Antuñano, M. J., et al., “Guidance for Medical Screening of Commercial Aerospace Passengers,” FAA Civil Aerospace 
Medical Institute (CAMI), Final Report, DOT/FAA/AM-06/1, Jan 2006:  
https://ntl.bts.gov/lib/39000/39900/39957/200601.pdf
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10C. Medical Recommendations for 
Operationally Critical Flight Crewmembers 
Proposed recommendations for operationally critical flight crewmembers 
participating in suborbital spaceflight:*
• An FAA first-class medical certificate using same age-based schedule as for Airline 
Transport Pilot (ATP) pilots
• Pre-flight medical evaluation
• Post-flight medical debrief with data collection
• An independent data repository of medical findings
• Periodic reevaluation of the current medical standards during the early stages of 
developmental flights
• Passive ionizing radiation dosimeters worn by each flight crewmember
• Auditory protection in the helmet or headset for all crewmembers
• Emergency egress training for all crewmembers
• Physiologic training (altitude chamber) to ensure flight crew recognition of signs and 
symptoms associated with decompression, including hypoxic changes
• Recent centrifuge or other G training
• Anti-G suit use on flights until more experience has been obtained
• Parabolic flight training
• Pressure suit use for commercial spaceflight operators
• Further investigation on effects on pilot performance from rapid changes in the 
acceleration/ microgravity/entry deceleration flight profile
*“Suborbital Commercial Spaceflight Crewmember Medical Issues,” Position Paper, Aerospace Medical  Association 
Commercial Spaceflight Working Group, Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, vol. 82, no. 4, Apr 2011, pp. 
475-484.  http://spacemedicineassociation.org/download/executive_archive_files/s11.pdf
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11. Spaceflight Participant Training
Three SFP training centers approved by FAA-AST:
• National AeroSpace Training and Research (NASTAR) Center, Southampton, 
PA
– http://www.nastarcenter.com/aerospace-training/space/passengers
– FAA Safety Approval No’s. SA 10-001, SA 12-004
– Basic Suborbital Space Training, Advanced Space Training, Space Payload 
Specialist Training, Space Suits and Systems Training
• Black Sky Training, Colorado City, TX
– https://blacksky.aero/
– FAA Safety Approval No’s. SA 13-005, SA 14-006
– Crew & Spaceflight Participant Training, Scenario-Based Physiology 
Training
• Waypoint 2 Space, Houston, TX
– http://www.waypoint2space.com/
– FAA Safety Approval No. SA 14-007
– Level 1 Overview Training, Level 2 Suborbital Space Environment Training. 
Level 3 Orbital Training Program scheduled to begin in 2020.
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12. ASTM International* Committee F47 
on Commercial Spaceflight
• Committee F47 formed 2016
• Industry utilizing ASTM’s neutral forum to develop safety and quality 
standards and recommended practices to facilitate positioning for future 
regulatory requirements as well as innovation in this progressing area.
• Nine technical subcommittees develop and maintain voluntary consensus 
standards.  Two are addressing human spaceflight safety:
– F47.01, Occupant Safety of Suborbital Vehicles
• Developing new Guide, “Fault Tolerance for Occupant Safety of Suborbital 
Vehicles”
– F47.02, Occupant Safety of Orbital Vehicles
https://www.astm.org/COMMITTEE/F47.htm
*Formerly American Society for Testing and Materials
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13A. Comparison with Another Challenging 
Environment: Deep Sea Submersibles
Deep Sea Submersibles - Overview
• Representative active submersibles, each owned by a national government:
– U.S.: DSV-2 Alvin, to 4,500 m., owned by U.S. Office of Naval Research (ONR), 
operated by Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WHOI)
– Australia: Deepsea Challenger (DCV 1), carried Titanic director, James 
Cameron, to ocean’s deepest point, Challenger Deep, >10,900 m.
– France: Nautile, to 6,000 m.
– Japan: Shinkai, to 6,500 m.
– China: Jiaolong, to 7,500 m.
• In development, commercial company:




13B. Human Safety in Deep Sea Submersibles
Human safety in submersibles is assured via a detailed systems 
certification approach:
• For example, safety of Alvin is controlled by a 350-page NAVSEA manual* 
specifying detailed certification procedures for materials and components, 
design factors, testing parameters, life support systems, airborne 
contaminants, and much more.
• The USG does not yet require that type of certification for sRLVs.  FAA-
AST’s role regarding sRLV safety is limited to licensing and regulating until a 
later date when the industry is mature.
*Naval Sea Systems Command, System and 
Certification Procedures Criteria Manual for Deep 
Submergence Systems, SS800-AG-MAN-010/P9290, 
Rev. A, Nov 3, 1998.  
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